“Pravova derzhava”. Issue 36 (2025), pages 294–305.

DOI: 10.33663/0869-2491-2025-36-294-305

Yushchyk Oleksiі
Understanding of law in the grip of juridical essence (to the clarifying the nature of law)

This article critically examines the methodology of defining the essence of law, revealing a fundamental flaw in many legal theories that equate the general concept of law with its specific form — juridical law. Legal scholars typically view law as a civilizational phenomenon, largely disregarding its historical development and the existence of other forms of law, such as primitive customary law (preceding juridical law) and humanistic law (which follows it). Only dialectical legal theory, developed in recent decades, has proposed this broader perspective, challenging the traditional focus on juridical law as the sole manifestation of legal reality.
A significant limitation of mainstream legal theories is their failure to address the species-level essence of law, often reducing it to class-based and state-sanctioned norms. While some theorists, such as S. S. Alekseev, recognize the idea of “humanistic law,” they frame it as an advanced stage of juridical law rather than a distinct form of law. Conversely, early societies are either considered devoid of legal structures or are assumed to operate under an ambiguous notion of “natural law,” which does not align with their actual social practices.
The article highlights a fundamental issue in legal categorization: legal scholars frequently classify law using arbitrary criteria without adhering to logical principles of taxonomic division. As a result, numerous subcategories of law—such as objective and subjective law, private and public law, national and international law—are defined inconsistently, lacking a systematic approach to distinguishing general and specific legal concepts. This methodological oversight obscures the deeper essence of law and prevents a coherent understanding of its true nature.
Even scholars closest to the dialectical approach, such as L. S. Yavich, failed to establish a clear methodology for determining the essence of law. Yavich attempted to explain law through its class-based nature and economic determination, arguing that juridical norms represent the institutionalized will of the ruling class. However, his analysis remains incomplete, as it does not clarify how this “deep essence” of law emerges or how it fundamentally structures legal relations. Yavich identifies juridical law’s normative properties, arguing that objective and subjective law are interdependent and function as a unified whole within legal systems. Nevertheless, he does not resolve key contradictions inherent in his framework, particularly regarding the relationship between legal norms and individual legal rights.
The article argues that a truly scientific understanding of law requires a dialectical approach that situates law within a broader historical and logical framework. Instead of viewing juridical law as the universal form of law, legal scholars must recognize the plurality of legal forms and analyze their evolution from primitive customary norms to class-based legal structures and beyond. Furthermore, legal norms should not be limited to legislative prescriptions, as many traditional theories assume. Rather, they must be understood as actual behavioral norms that materialize in real legal relationships, thereby moving beyond the abstract “objective-subjective” dichotomy.
A comparison is also made with A. F. Zakomlistov’s “normological approach,” which claims to offer a universal legal theory free from class-based constraints.
However, Zakomlistov reduces the essence of law to its juridical form, defining it through anthropological and ethical abstractions rather than historical material conditions. His view of law as an “anthropological norm” that defines human existence detaches law from its concrete social and economic basis, ultimately leading to an abstract and non-historical legal conception.
Legal understanding will remain trapped within the confines of juridical essence unless scholars adopt a dialectical methodology that fully accounts for law’s historical transformations. While juridical law remains the dominant legal form in class-based societies, it does not exhaust the full spectrum of legal reality. A comprehensive legal theory must integrate insights from dialectical logic and materialist history to accurately define the nature of law as a social phenomenon. Without such a methodology, legal scholars risk conflating law with state-sanctioned norms, thereby obscuring its deeper ontological and historical foundations.

Key words: essence of law, juridical essence, dialectical legal theory, legal normativity, class-based law, types of law, primitive law, humanistic law.

References

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6. Ibid.
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